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 There is no one agreed-upon definition of biosecurity, but generally it can be understood as 
society’s collective responsibility to safeguard the population from the dangers presented by 
pathogenic microbes (Fidler and Gostin, 2008: 4).  Crucially, these dangers can arise from natural 
sources such as the emergence of a novel influenza virus whose pandemic potential is increased as a 
result of intensified global circuits of circulation and exchange.  Or they can be released in deliberate 
acts via biological weapons and biological terrorism.  In response to these threats, biodefence efforts 
utilise tools such as vaccines, therapeutics and detection methods in coordination with data 
collection, analysis and intelligence gathering to prevent or mitigate biological attacks against people 
and agriculture (Ryan and Glarum, 2008: 19).  In recent years, a whole panoply of unique institutions 
and organisations have been developed, primarily in the USA, along these lines.  This has included 
the emergence of a unique category of medicine termed the “medical countermeasure”: security 
technologies, created to combat a range of threats such as anthrax, smallpox and botulism, 
developed in coordination with private industry and stockpiled to respond to any attack.  Advances 
in the biological sciences have played a key role in the emergence of these new technologies that, as 
will be investigated, also provide the basis for new and disturbing biological weapons.   
This entry will begin with a brief history of the use of disease as a weapon before turning to 
the efforts that characterise biodefence today.  It will look primarily at the creation of the largest 
civilian biodefence system set up to date in the USA.  Through an analysis of the development of this 
apparatus, the key political and conceptual issues that shape the arena of biosecurity and 
biodefence are detailed.  This includes the role of technologies and research of dual-use concern, the 
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issues of attribution and the strategic limitations that arise with the use of biological weapons, the 
bridging of public health and national security in the search for biosecurity, and the socio-technical 
nature of knowledge necessary to take advantage of advances in the life sciences in the 
development of biological weapons and new defences. 
History of Biological Weapons 
 
  It may be fair to say that pathogens and biological toxins have been used as weapons in 
conflicts throughout history.  The mobilisation of disease as a weapon parallels the scientific 
knowledge and understanding developed regarding the nature and workings of pathogens (Ryan and 
Glarum, 2008: 7).  As early as 600 B.C. filth, cadavers, animal carcasses, and contagion were 
recognised as having a debilitating effect on opposition personnel.  During the siege of Caffa in 1346, 
diseased cadavers were hurled into the besieged city to spread plague and panic (Riedel, 2004: 400).  
Smallpox developed a notorious reputation, in part as a result of its accidental and deliberate spread 
to unsuspecting and susceptible populations with little to no immunity, particularly during the first 
contact between European colonisers and the New World.  In the 1800s British armed forces in 
North America distributed blankets previously used by patients infected with smallpox.  The 
weaponisation of smallpox in this fashion against American Indians created epidemics, killing more 
than 50% of many affected tribes. 
 One key factor that complicates our understanding of the deliberate use and weaponisation 
of disease throughout history is the level of attribution and responsibility that can be afforded to 
particular actors.  Biological agents that are favoured in deliberate attacks are naturally occurring, 
and without microbiological and epidemiological data, outbreaks often cannot be separated from 
natural endemic or epidemic cases (see Christopher et al., 1997).  Another key factor that 
complicates the use of disease in historical conflicts is one’s level of understanding and influence 
given to the microbes themselves.  Terms such as “misasmas” and “malaria” reflect the perception 
and understanding of the origin and spread of disease that predominated before it could be 
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attributed to particular biological organisms (Ryan and Glarum, 2008: 7).  The idea that 
microorganisms shared our environment and caused disease, the basis of the ‘germ theory’ of 
disease, remained controversial well into the nineteenth century.  The arguments within this theory, 
advanced by Louis Pasteur and Robert Koch, would eventually be formally endorsed by the French 
Academy of sciences in 1864 (Levy, 2002: 16).  With this shift in scientific understanding, the 
development and use of biological weapons would take an altogether more programmatic shape.   
 The First and Second World Wars would see heavy state investment into biological weapons 
as an added dimension in the military arsenal.  Initially such efforts were directed against animals 
and their central role in the logistical process.  The Second World War would see attacks and 
experiments on military personnel and civilians as well.  One of the most notorious organisations in 
this regard was Japanese Unit 731.  Numerous attacks and experiments utilising agents such as 
plague and anthrax were responsible for the deaths of thousands (Ryan and Glarum, 2008: 9).  An 
unusual outbreak of inhalational Tularemia in 1942, shortly before the battle of Stalingrad, sickened 
troops on both sides.  The potential for blowback against one’s own troops is one strategic limitation 
of biological weapons.  Accounts from former Soviet scientists such as Kanatjan Alibekov (Ken 
Alibek) later revealed that the Soviets had weaponised this disease a year before (see Alibek and 
Handelman, 2000).  From 1943 onwards the British and US biological weapons programmes came 
into effect.  British efforts would focus on the viability and dissemination of Bacillus anthracis, the 
spores of which are the causative agent of anthrax (Ryan and Glarum, 2008: 10).  Testing of the 
delivery of the spores via a conventional bomb was conducted at Gruinard Island off the coast of 
Scotland.  The island would remain contaminated for decades until an extensive decontamination 
programme in the 1980s and 1990s removed the possibility of infection and death.  The potential for 
long-term contamination of a territory or area preventing its habitation represents another strategic 
limitation on the use of biological agents as a weapon of war. 
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 State development of biological weapons would continue during the Cold War.  This period 
would also see a number of allegations between states accusing others of the deliberate use of 
biological agents.  This included statements by the Eastern European press of the use of biological 
weapons in Oman in 1957 by Great Britain, Chinese allegations that the USA caused a cholera 
epidemic in Hong Kong in 1961, and in 1969 accusations by Egypt against “imperialistic aggressors” 
of the use of biological weapons in the Middle East, specifically a cholera epidemic in Iraq in 1966 
(Riedel, 2004: 403).  Such accusations highlight the difficulty of placing concrete responsibility for the 
emergence of disease at an actor’s door and the way in which blame is mobilised politically within 
wider conflicts.  Concern regarding the widespread development and potential use of these 
weapons grew in the international arena.  As a result, the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on 
Their Destruction, also known as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), was created (Riedel, 
2004: 403).  The BWC only permits the development, production, and stockpiling of pathogens or 
toxins for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.  Unfortunately, the BWC suffers from 
a number of issues including a lack of clear guidelines on inspections, control of disarmament, 
adherence to the protocol, enforcement, and the issue of how to deal with violations.  Controversies 
also abound regarding the definition of “defensive research” and the quantities of pathogens 
necessary for benevolent research (Riedel, 2004: 403).  For all its limitations, the BWC represents 
concerted effort to achieve consensus at the international level regarding biosecurity. 
 The US would terminate its offensive biological weapons programme by executive orders in 
1969 and 1970, with the entire arsenal of biological weapons destroyed between May 1971 and 
February 1973 (Riedel, 2004: 404).  Despite widespread signatures to the BWC in 1972, many 
countries would not follow suit and continued to work on activities prohibited by the convention.  
An epidemic of anthrax in 1979 would illuminate the massive size and scale of the Soviet program.  
Reports of an anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk, a city of 1.2 million people 1400 km east of Moscow, 
appeared in the Western Press in 1980.  The emergence of gastrointestinal anthrax was attributed at 
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first to the consumption of contaminated meat and, in the case of cutaneous anthrax, to contact 
with diseased animals.  This explanation for the 96 cases of human anthrax, 79 gastrointestinal and 
17 cutaneous leading to 64 deaths was heavily questioned and debated (Meselson et al. 1994: 
1203).  An investigation by independent scientists mapped the geographical distribution of human 
and animal cases in conjunction with wind and meteorological conditions.  It concluded that the 
outbreak resulted from the wind-borne spread of an aerosol of anthrax pathogen (Meselson et al. 
1994: 1206).  In May of 1992, President Boris Yeltsin, the chief Communist Party official of the 
Sverdlovsk region in 1979, confirmed that the Soviet military was responsible for the release 
(Meselson et al. 1994: 1203).  The largest documented outbreak of human inhalation anthrax was 
thus the result of an accidental release from a military microbiology facility on Monday, 2 April, 
1979.   
The accidental release of anthrax from a biological weapons production facility paid 
testament to the industrial scale and capability of the Soviet biological weapons efforts.  Such efforts 
that fell under the organisation of Biopreparat employed and trained around 60,000 people in 
biological weapons competence over a 30-year period (Koplow, 2003: 86).  Accounts from former 
Soviet scientists such as Vladimir Pasechnik, Ken Alibek, and Sergei Popov also testified to the scale 
and capability of the Soviet biological weapons efforts.  Such revelations in combination with 
advances in the biological sciences, the emerging interest of terrorist groups in biological agents 
following the end of the Cold War, the attacks of September 11th 2001, and the anthrax letters in 
their wake, would drive investment by the US government into the largest civilian biodefence 
apparatus seen to date. 
The Emergence of Civilian Biodefence in the US 
 




Biological agents have been divided into three categories - A, B and C – by the Centres for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in the USA.  The rationale for this categorisation is based on 
the level of public health importance.  High priority agents pose a risk to national security as they 
can be easily disseminated and transmitted from person to person, result in high mortality rates, 
have the potential to cause panic and disruption, and require special action for public health 
preparedness (Ryan and Glarum, 2008: 39).  Category A agents are of the most concern for terrorism 
and defence experts as they have the greatest potential for harm and disruption.  Included in this 
category are diseases such as anthrax, smallpox, plague, tularaemia, botulism and viral 
haemorrhagic fevers such as Ebola. 
Advances in the biological sciences in general and the molecularisation of biology in 
particular have ushered in a new era regarding the development of biological weapons and the need 
for defences against these weapons.  Genetic engineering, also known as gene splicing, recombinant 
DNA and genetic modification, opens up the possibility that terrorists may use this molecular 
knowledge to create a new class of biological agents to expand the biological weapons (BW) 
paradigm (Petro et al., 2003: 161).  The possibilities opened up by this technology have led to a new 
classification of genetically modified BW agents as a separate category of BW.  This category of 
weapon influenced the US government's understanding of the threat of bioterrorism and its medical 
countermeasure development strategy deployed in response.  Potential modifications of traditional 
agents include antibiotic resistance, increased aerosol stability, or heightened pathogenesis (Petro et 
al., 2003: 162).  It may also be possible to make it harder to detect traditional pathogens.   
These molecular possibilities have also driven fears that potential terrorists may use 
biotechnology to generate an entirely new class of fully engineered agents referred to as advanced 
biological warfare (ABW) agents (Petro et al., 2003: 162).  Future agents may be rationally 
engineered to “target specific human biological systems at the molecular level” (Petro et al., 2003: 
162).  In a move away from traditional agents, the specific biochemical pathways critical for 
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physiological processes may be targeted by engineered agents.  The capabilities of these ABWs are 
only limited by the extent of the parallel advances in biotechnology and would pose significant 
problems for the development of new defences.  Molecular-based technologies have also opened up 
the possibility of synthesising viral genomes facilitating the creation and reconstruction of viruses 
from scratch (Lentzos and Silver, 2012: 133).   
Technologies such as genetic engineering pose a “dual-use dilemma” because it is difficult to 
prevent their use without foregoing their beneficial application (Tucker, 2012: 1).  Further, it has 
been recognised that many of the technologies with the potential to do the most good are also 
capable of causing the most harm.  “Dual use” refers to “materials, hardware, and knowledge that 
have peaceful applications but could also be exploited for the illicit production of nuclear, chemical, 
or biological weapons” (Tucker, 2012: 2).  In contrast to, say, nuclear technology, the pathogenic 
bacteria and viruses that are used in biotechnology are readily available from natural sources; have 
numerous legitimate applications in research and industry; are present in many types of facilities, 
such as hospitals and universities; and are impossible to detect at a distance (Tucker, 2012: 2).  
These factors make the use of biological agents and technologies a particularly pressing dilemma 
and would significantly shape the US government’s biodefence efforts. 
Concern Regarding Terrorist Use of Biological Weapons in the USA 
Concern regarding the ability of terrorists to shape and enhance the killing power of 
biological weapons rose to prominence in the USA in the 1990s.  Foremost in shaping these concerns 
were the activities of the Japanese religious cult, the Aum Shinrikyo.  In March 1995, the cult 
attacked the Tokyo subway with the chemical nerve agent sarin, killing 12 people.  Following an 
investigation it was revealed that between 1990 and 1994 the group had attempted to produce a 
number of biological agents including anthrax and botulinum toxin.  On nine occasions they 
attempted to disperse what they had produced but this caused no effect (Leitenberg, 2001: 140).  
These failures occurred despite the fact that the group had access to virtually unlimited funds, four 
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years to work undisturbed, and could draw on a dozen people with graduate training.  Further, 
despite the expenditure of several million dollars the group was unable to obtain any information 
concerning biological weapons from scientists that worked in the former Soviet Union’s industrial-
size biological weapons programme (Leitenberg, 2001: 140).  The Aum case was interpreted in 
government circles as representing a new avenue opened up to potential terrorists as a result of the 
increased power of biotechnology.  A key conceptual issue recently raised in this area may explain 
the group’s failure.  The effective and efficient use of biotechnology has been characterised as being 
dependent upon knowledge of a social and technical character (Vogel, 2008: 239-240).  Such 
knowledge must be developed over time through experimentation, without which efforts are bound 
to fail.   
The actions of the Aum group stoked fears that terrorists may gain access to widespread 
technology that could make the job of biological weapons production much easier.  The US 
government’s perception of insecurity posed by bioterrorism in the 1990s was also influenced by 
Iraq’s biological weapons development program and the revelations from former Soviet scientists, 
noted above, as to the scale and capability of the Soviet biological weapons program.  Of particular 
concern was the Soviet’s use of genetic engineering technologies to create an enhanced strain of 
plague (Miller, Broad and Engelberg, 2002: 303) and anthrax (Garrett, 2002: 359).  The Soviet 
program was recognised as carrying out the first applications of new genetic engineering 
technologies to “improve” biological agents (Dando, 2007: 79).  In order to understand the 
weaponisation of biological agents past and future, state and terrorist, the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) embarked on project Clear Vision in 1997.  This project tested a Soviet-style bomblet 
and engaged in the military implications of gene splicing (Miller, Broad and Engelberg, 2002: 295-6). 
 The initial response of the US government to this threat focused on funding for public health 
infrastructure, research and development and state preparedness, including the stockpiling of 
antibiotics and other medicines.   Importantly, the Department for Health and Human Services, up 
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until this time, an exclusively public health institution, would receive funding in its budget to 
implement counterterrorism measures.  This marked the first time that the public health system had 
been integrated directly into the national security system.  One of the key political challenges in the 
area of biosecurity is the management of the effects of the integration of national security and 
public health.  Concerns have arisen around this integration, particularly regarding the prioritisation 
of national security at the expense of public health.  Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001, letters filled with “weapons grade” anthrax traced back to the United States Army Medical 
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) (Ryan and Glarum, 2008: 282), would kill five 
and spread disease and panic in Washington D.C. and neighbouring areas as far afield as Florida.  
These events significantly intensified the response premised upon the integration of public health 
and national security and sparked into motion the development and stockpiling of an entirely new 
discursive category of medicine that would signify the merging of these two areas: the medical 
countermeasure.   
The Development of US Civilian Biodefence  
 In June of 2002, the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act 
was signed into law establishing the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) to store medical 
countermeasures, extending and replacing the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile created in 1998.  
The National Strategy for Homeland Security of 2002 set out the decision to develop broad-spectrum 
vaccines, antimicrobials and antidotes.  This would augment the SNS, which at that time already 
contained a sufficient antibiotic supply to begin treatment for 20 million persons exposed to Bacillus 
anthracis and was projected to contain enough smallpox vaccine for every US resident by the end of 
that year.  In 2004, the Project BioShield Act was signed, delivering US$5.6bn over ten years to 
incentivise and encourage the private sector to partner with the US government to develop medical 
countermeasures against biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear attacks (Ryan and Glarum, 
2008: 256).  It was also set up to provide a novel mechanism for federal acquisition of those newly 
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developed countermeasures.  Such mechanisms are necessary as historically markets have failed to 
inspire socially optimal levels of drug and vaccine innovation and consumption in the biodefence 
arena (see Hoyt, 2012). 
 This novel mechanism provides private industry with a guaranteed government-backed 
market for the sale of medical countermeasures.  Unfortunately, this incentive structure was not 
sufficient to entice large and experienced pharmaceutical companies to work in this area.  Smaller 
and less experienced biotech companies that have proved interested do not possess the experience 
or resources sufficient to drive a potential product through the extremely arduous development 
pathway.  These issues presented themselves starkly in the failure of the first Project BioShield 
contract for a new anthrax vaccine.  To address these issues, the US government created the 
Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) in 2006, following the passage 
of the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act.  BARDA addresses the shortcomings of Project 
BioShield by providing companies with a range of financial and technical support mechanisms 
throughout the drug development pathway (see Elbe, Roemer-Mahler and Long, 2015).  Over ten 
years from 2004 to 2014 the combined efforts of Project BioShield and BARDA have invested just 
over $3bn into the stockpiling of 75 million 25 thousand medical countermeasures to address 
smallpox, anthrax and botulism (Gottron, 2014: 8).   
Project BioShield, BARDA, and the production, stockpiling, and dissemination of medical 
countermeasures sit within the mitigation arm of the US government’s comprehensive emergency 
management of bioterrorism and biodefence.  Comprehensive emergency management consist 
altogether of mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery (Ryan and Glarum, 2008: 260).  The 
BioWatch and BioSense programs and the Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI) represent further 
preparedness tools.  BioWatch provides early warning of a biological attack by sampling the air in 
high-risk cities for six particular pathogens.  BioSense collects nationwide public health data to 
identify peaks or trends in disease occurrence (Ryan and Glarum, 2008: 264).  The CRI facilitates the 
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dissemination of medical countermeasures during an emergency.  A response element is provided 
by the Laboratory Response Network (LRN) of federal and state public health laboratories, which 
consist of sentinel, reference, and national laboratories.  The Federal Bureau of Investigation's 
Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU) and the National Guard WMD Civil Support Teams (CST) 
both also carry out emergency response and recovery.  This array of institutions and organisations 
represents the most advanced efforts to date to implement civilian biodefence and protect 
populations from deliberate biological attack.   
Key Developments and Future Issues 
 
 Various experiments have taken place over the last decade that have sent shock waves 
through the biosecurity community.  In 2011, using synthetic genomics, scientists mutated the H5N1 
flu virus into a version that was transmissible through the air between ferrets, the laboratory 
equivalent of human beings.   Ron Fouchier, the scientist responsible, was criticised for deliberately 
creating a mammalian strain of pandemic flu.  The details of the experiment were termed a 
cookbook for terrorists and prevented from being published.  In 2002, synthetic genomics was used 
to recreate the poliovirus prompting fears that terrorists may use this technology to recreate other 
more deadly viral agents.  In 2005, the Spanish influenza virus, responsible for killing fifty million 
people worldwide between 1918 and 1919, was also recreated using this tool.  This was done with 
the aim of understanding the genetic basis of its virulence so as to guide the development of 
effective antiviral drugs.  In principle it is now possible for scientists to reconstruct any virus for 
which an accurate genetic sequence exists.    
This has had particularly disturbing implications for the area of biodefence.  In March 2017, 
it was announced that synthetic biology was used to successfully synthesize the horsepox virus in 
the search to develop a safer vaccine against smallpox.  The basis of these efforts resides in the fact 
that smallpox and horsepox are a part of the same family of orthopox viruses.  Using the publicly 
available genome of the horsepox virus, the virus was created from scratch.  With the complete 
12 
 
genome sequence of multiple strains of the variola virus, the causative agent of smallpox, available 
on the Internet since the early 1990s (Koblentz, 2017: 3), fears have arisen that similar efforts could 
be used to reintroduce this disease amongst an extremely vulnerable population.  Smallpox was 
declared eradicated by the World Health Organisation in 1980.  British medical photographer, Janet 
Parker, was the last recorded person to die from the disease as a result of a laboratory accident in 
the UK in 1978.  Along with the reconstruction of organisms, the editing of their genetic compliment 
has become easier as a result of the emergence of CRISPR (Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short 
Palindromic Repeats) along with CRISPR-associated (Cas) proteins.  CRISPR represents a “powerful, 
efficient, and reliable tool for editing genes in any organism” (Caplan et al., 2015: 1421).  This offers 
up the prospect that potential bioterror pathogens may be enhanced in respect to their infectivity 
and virulence.  These types of technologies serve to intensify the dual-use dilemma and present a 
particular difficulty that must be addressed in any future investment in biodefence measures and 
medical countermeasure development efforts. 
Conclusion 
 
 This entry has analysed the history of the use of biological weapons and the development of 
civilian biodefence in the USA in relation to key conceptual issues that fundamentally shape the area 
of biosecurity and biodefence.  The historical use of biological weapons revealed the strategic 
limitations that arise in any deployment, specifically from blowback and long-term contamination.  
Biotechnological advances have served to raise fears that existing pathogens could be enhanced and 
that previously eradicated diseases could be reconstituted in synthetic form.  However, the socio-
technical nature of knowledge regarding the effective use of these technologies complicates the 
ease with which non-state actors can mobilise them for nefarious purposes.  Paradoxically, the 
proliferation of biodefence efforts and laboratories across the USA following the anthrax letters may 
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